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USING THE SUPREME COURT’S
ENIGMATIC COMMERCE CLAUSE
HOLDING IN SEBELIUS TO
CHALLENGE CONGRESS’S BROKEN
RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD
COREY J. WALKER*
At the intersection of energy law, environmental law, and interstate commerce
lies a complex piece of legislation called the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS).
Aimed at increasing energy efficiency and supporting alternative fuel sources,
the RFS requires that oil producers and importers offset their carbon footprints
by obtaining and retiring compliance credits called Renewable Identification
Numbers (RINs). However, for major oil refiners, the financial burdens of this
compliance system distribute unevenly. Refiners that blend oil components into
gasoline and diesel generate RINs as a byproduct of their business model,
mitigating their compliance costs. On the other hand, independent refiners that
do not blend oil components into fuel must purchase RINs in a secondary
market, often resulting in massive compliance costs.
Because the RFS and its RINs compliance regime impact some refiners more
than others, it has remained hotly debated since its expansion in 2007. This
RFS controversy arguably peaked in January 2018, when one of the largest oil
refiners in the United States, Philadelphia Energy Solutions, filed for
bankruptcy, citing RFS compliance costs as the root cause of its financial
difficulties. Industry backlash was swift enough that in October 2018, the
* Senior Staff, American University Law Review, Volume 68; J.D. Candidate, May
2019, American University Washington College of Law; B.A., Economics, 2010, The George
Washington University. I would like to thank Professor William J. Snape, III for his
guidance and insight; the American University Law Review staff for their tireless work
and invaluable contributions; and Professor Elizabeth Earle Beske for her support and
encouragement. I would also like to dedicate this Comment to my grandfather,
H. Thomas Summers, whose passion for knowledge remains an inspiration and
suggests that the secret to longevity and happiness is to never stop questioning.
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Trump Administration announced that it had directed the Environmental Protection
Agency, the executive agency charged with enforcing the RFS, to consider reforms aimed
at increasing transparency and preventing price manipulation in the RINs market.
This Comment argues that the reforms suggested by the Trump Administration
are insufficient to repair a compliance regime that is deeply flawed and beyond
repair. Instead, refiners like Philadelphia Energy Solutions—the so-called “losers”
in the RFS compliance regime—should look to challenge the RFS on constitutional
grounds. Specifically, this Comment argues that refiners may challenge the RFS
using Chief Justice John Roberts’s Commerce Clause holding from National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, which stated that Congress
may not compel market participation as an extension of its Commerce Clause power.
This Comment examines both the RFS and the unsettled legacy of Chief Justice
Roberts’s Sebelius decision, arguing that the latter provides refiners like
Philadelphia Energy Solutions with a unique constitutional challenge to a
thoroughly broken piece of legislation.
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“The EPA asserts that more E15 gasoline must be blended in order for
producers to meet the RFS, true? . . . Let me ask you, do you think we
are headed for a train wreck, as currently defined by Congress?”
— Representative Paul Gosar1
“I am not aware of the definition of train wreck by the Congress.”
— Christopher Grundler,
Director, EPA Office of Transportation and Air Quality2
INTRODUCTION
In October 2011, federal agents raided the offices of a biofuels
company called Absolute Fuels in Lubbock, Texas, leaving dozens of

1. Up Against the Blend Wall: Examining the EPA’s Role in the Renewable Fuel Standard:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Health Care and Entitlements of the H. Comm.
on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. 90 (2013) (statement of Rep. Gosar).
2. Id. (statement of Christopher Grundler, Director of EPA’s Office of
Transportation and Air Quality).
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surprised members of the community without jobs.3 Amid local
confusion, federal authorities carried out a series of similar raids on
the private home and offices of Absolute Fuels’s Chief Executive
Officer, Jeff Gunselman.4 In the resulting investigations, federal agents
seized luxury cars, sports memorabilia, an anti-aircraft gun, a
Gulfstream private jet, a flamethrower, and a decommissioned Patton
military tank.5 Two years later, in March 2013, United States District
Judge Sam R. Cummings sentenced Gunselman to 188 months in
federal prison and ordered him to pay nearly $55 million in restitution.6
At nearly the same time as Gunselman’s sentencing, approximately
1800 miles away in White Plains, New York, trading firm OceanConnect,
LLC filed for bankruptcy.7 Through the summer of 2012, the company
spent months in and out of federal court defending itself from breach
of contract claims filed by other trading houses and oil refining
interests.8 OceanConnect lost most of these suits and failed in its
3. See Government Raid Raises Questions About Absolute Fuels, KCBD (Oct. 27, 2011,
10:28 PM), http://www.kcbd.com/story/15896146/government-raid-raises-questionsabout-absolute-fuels (interviewing a confused Absolute Fuels employee about the raid).
4. See Walt Nett, Absolute Fuels Founder Pleads Guilty to All Charges, LUBBOCK
AVALANCHE-J. (Dec. 14, 2012, 2:57 PM), http://lubbockonline.com/courts/2012-1214/absolute-fuels-founder-pleads-guilty-all-charges.
5. See Cole Shooter, Jeffrey David Gunselman Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for
Fraudulent Bio-Diesel Business, KFYO (Mar. 29, 2013), http://kfyo.com/jeffrey-davidgunselman-sentenced-to-15-years-in-prison-for-fraudulent-bio-diesel-business (noting
that Gunselman spent $12 million on these extravagant purchases, which also included
real estate, sports tickets, and corporate sponsorships); Texas Man Accused in Biodiesel
RIN Fraud Indicted, ARGUS (Aug. 9, 2012, 4:55 PM), https://www.argusmedia.com/
pages/NewsBody.aspx?id=809422&menu=yes (detailing Gunselman’s purchase of
“cars, sports memorabilia and a demilitarized tank, anti-aircraft gun and flamethrower,
among other items”).
6. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Bio-Diesel
Fuel Company Owner Sentenced to 188 Months in Federal Prison on Wire Fraud,
Money Laundering and False Statements Convictions (Mar. 29, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndtx/pr/bio-diesel-fuel-company-owner-sentenced188-months-federal-prison-wire-fraud-money.
7. See Katy Stech, Biofuel Scandal Pushes Trading Firm into Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J.:
BANKRUPTCY BEAT (Feb. 8, 2013, 5:30 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2013/
02/08/biofuel-scandal-pushes-trading-firm-into-bankruptcy (explaining that OceanConnect
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy due to several lawsuits alleging that it sold fake biofuel credits).
8. See, e.g., Vinmar Overseas, Ltd. v. OceanConnect, LLC, Nos. H-11-4311, H-114629, 2012 WL 3599486, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2012) (consolidating multiple suits
against OceanConnect for allegedly selling the plaintiffs fake Renewable Identification
Numbers (RINs)); George E. Warren Corp. v. OceanConnect, LLC, No. 2:12-cv-14125KMM, 2012 WL 12869199, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2012) (addressing OceanConnect’s
motion to dismiss a breach of contract suit brought by a gasoline company that
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attempts to indemnify itself by impleading various administrative
agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).9 In its
filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection, OceanConnect reported
that it ended 2012 with a massive $1.7 million loss.10
But while both Gunselman and OceanConnect had a difficult 2013,
they fared far better financially than major oil refiners, which suddenly
faced some staggering new compliance costs. For some refiners, 2013
added hundreds of millions of dollars in operating expenditures,
seemingly out of nowhere.11 By August 2013, one major refiner faced
a tab of an incredible $800 million.12
The unifying link in this energy industry triptych was a unique set of
regulations called the Renewable Fuel Standard (“RFS”),13 a legislative
behemoth enacted in 2005 when Congress passed the Energy Policy
Act.14 Aimed at incentivizing the production and use of cleaner, more
efficient transportation fuels, the RFS brought sweeping changes to

purchased invalid RINs); Lansing Trade Grp., LLC v. OceanConnect, LLC, No. 122090-JTM, 2012 WL 2449514, at *1–2 (D. Kan. June 26, 2012) (suing OceanConnect
over breach of contract and warranties with Lansing Trade Group).
9. See Lansing Trade Grp., LLC v. OceanConnect, LLC, No. 12-2090-JTM-GLR,
2013 WL 120158, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 9, 2013) (denying OceanConnect’s motion for
leave to file a third-party complaint asserting claims against the EPA); George E.
Warren Corp. v. OceanConnect, LLC, No. 12-cv-14125-KMM, 2012 WL 12868746, at
*2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2012) (dismissing OceanConnect’s claim against the EPA after
finding that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata); Vinmar Overseas, Ltd. v.
OceanConnect, LLC, No. H-11-4311, 2012 WL 5989206, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2012)
(dismissing OceanConnect’s motion for leave to file a third-party impleader complaint
against the EPA).
10. Stech, supra note 7.
11. See, e.g., Tristan R. Brown, Ballparking Valero’s Future RIN Costs, SEEKING ALPHA
(Aug. 15, 2017, 10:54 AM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4099047-ballparkingvaleros-future-rin-costs (identifying as the source of Valero Energy’s high annual RIN
expenditure costs the spike in D6 ethanol RINs in 2013, prior to which the credits
traded for mere pennies); Tristan R. Brown, As RIN Prices Fly, a Look Back at Their Impact
on Refiners, SEEKINGALPHA (Feb. 2, 2015, 1:45 AM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/
2872976-as-rin-prices-fly-a-look-back-at-their-impact-on-refiners (describing RIN prices
from May 2013 through the end of 2014).
12. Sabina Zawadzki, U.S. Refiners, Plagued by RINsanity, See ‘Half Step’ on Biofuels,
REUTERS (Aug. 7, 2013, 12:16 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-ethanol/us-refiners-plagued-by-rinsanity-see-half-step-on-biofuels-idUSBRE97605420130807.
13. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Renewable Fuel Standard Program,
72 Fed. Reg. 23,900 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80 (2017)).
14. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).

672

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:667

the oil industry in the United States by imposing massive financial
burdens on some industry players.15
Oddly enough, in the same cruel 2012 summer that felled Gunselman
and OceanConnect and sowed the seeds of huge financial losses for oil
refiners, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down a decision
with huge consequences for another industry altogether. In a landmark
ruling in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius,16 the
Supreme Court ruled that a portion of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA)17 called the “individual mandate”18 was an
unconstitutional extension of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.19
Although the Court ultimately upheld the individual mandate as
permissible use of Congress’s power to tax and spend,20 the Court took
issue with Congress using the Commerce Clause to force individuals to
participate in the market for health insurance.21 In a powerful but
mysterious opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts put a new wrinkle into
Commerce Clause jurisprudence by stating plainly that while Congress
may regulate interstate commerce under its Article I power, it may not
compel market participation under the guise of regulation.22
Following the Sebelius decision, both state and federal courts and legal
scholars struggled to make sense of just what Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion23

15. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text (discussing the market effects of
speculation and volatility in the RIN market).
16. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
17. Pub L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
18. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 539 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012)).
19. Id. at 558 (Roberts, C.J.). The Court also found that the individual mandate
could not be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at 561.
20. Id. at 574 (majority opinion).
21. See id. at 552, 558 (Roberts, C.J.).
22. See id. at 552 (“The individual mandate . . . does not regulate existing
commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become active in commerce . . . .
Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely
because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain to
congressional authority.”).
23. The Court styled Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion as its own, but no other
Justices formally joined the opinion in its entirety. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Parts I, II, and III-C.
Only Justices Breyer and Kagan joined his opinion in Part IV, and no other Justices
joined his opinion in Parts III-A, III-B, and III-D. See id. at 529.
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meant for the Commerce Clause.24 Nearly six years since the decision,
circuits remain split and the debate continues.25
However, 2018 may have introduced a catalyst with the potential to
unify the embattled RFS and the unsettled legacy of Sebelius. In January
2018, the RFS claimed a casualty that reached beyond local and
industry news when Philadelphia Energy Solutions, the tenth-largest
refinery in the United States, filed for bankruptcy.26 In a sweeping
indictment of the regulatory scheme, Philadelphia Energy Solutions
attributed its dire financial straits to “skyrocketing” costs under the RFS
compliance regime, calling the system “broken.”27 Notably, the refiner
reported that in 2017 it spent $218 million—twice what it spent on
payroll—on meeting its compliance obligations.28
As perhaps the first perfectly situated plaintiff, Philadelphia Energy
Solutions can likely challenge the RFS using the rationale articulated
in Chief Justice Roberts’s enigmatic Commerce Clause holding in
Sebelius. This Comment argues that such a challenge carries the
potential to remedy a thoroughly broken regulatory scheme and, in
the process, provide the Supreme Court with an opportunity to bring
clarity to its currently unsettled Commerce Clause jurisprudence.

24. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional
Gestalt, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2013) (summarizing the struggles of circuit courts
to uniformly apply the Chief Justice’s Commerce Clause holding); infra note 254 and
accompanying text (detailing scholarly disagreement on whether the Chief Justice’s
Commerce Clause holding reflects binding precedent).
25. Compare United States v. Henry, 688 F.3d 637, 641 n.5 (9th Cir. 2012)
(acknowledging the existence of controversy over whether Chief Justice Roberts’s
Commerce Clause opinion binds federal courts and declining to opine on the matter),
and United States v. Roszkowski, 700 F.3d 50, 58 n.3 (1st Cir. 2012) (following Henry
and abstaining from the Sebelius Commerce Clause debate), with United States v. Rose,
714 F.3d 362, 371 (6th Cir. 2013) (treating Chief Justice Roberts’s Commerce Clause
holding as binding precedent), and United States v. Robbins, 729 F.3d 131, 135–36
(2d Cir. 2013) (assuming, for the purposes of analysis, that the Commerce Clause
discussion in Sebelius controls in relevant cases).
26. See, e.g., Jessica DiNapoli & Jarret Renshaw, Exclusive: Philadelphia Energy
Solutions to File for Bankruptcy—Memo, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2018, 6:59 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philadelphiaenergysolutionsbankruptc/exclusive-philadelphia-energy-solutions-to-file-for-bankruptcy-memoidUSKBN1FA18P (attributing the company’s finance issues to costly biofuel laws);
Matt Egan, Largest East Coast Oil Refinery Goes Bankrupt, Blaming “Broken” EPA Rules,
CNN MONEY (Jan. 22, 2018, 4:40 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/01/22/inv
esting/oil-refinery-bankruptcy-philadelphia-energy-solutions/index.html (summarizing
the circumstances behind Philadelphia Energy Solution’s bankruptcy filing).
27. Id.
28. Id.
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Part I of this Comment details the origins of the RFS and summarizes
the regulatory framework, including how its compliance credit-based
enforcement scheme burdens obligated parties.29 Part I also provides
background on the Supreme Court’s Sebelius decision and briefly
summarizes several intervening cases in which plaintiffs attempted to
apply a post-Sebelius Commerce Clause challenge in other contexts.30
Part I concludes with a brief overview of the legal deference courts give
to administrative agency interpretations of statutory directives, a
doctrine known as Chevron deference.31 Next, Part II describes how the
RFS remains an unresolved problem in dire need of revision or
repeal.32 After briefly distinguishing alternative methods of remedying
the RFS problem, this Comment argues that because Chief Justice
Roberts’s Commerce Clause holding in Sebelius is binding precedent, a
prospective challenger may seek to invalidate the RFS as an
unconstitutional compulsion of commercial activity.33 Finally, this
Comment concludes that, whereas alternative methods of revision fall
short, challenging the RFS as an invalid extension of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power represents a unique opportunity to both
clean up a broken RFS and bring clarity to the Supreme Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence in the wake of Sebelius.34
I. BACKGROUND
Comprehending the RFS and Sebelius individually, much less the two
in unison, requires at least a basic outline of several fundamental
concepts concerning the domestic oil industry, Congress’s attempts to
regulate transportation fuels, the power delegated to Congress by
Article I of the Constitution, and the deference owed to administrative
agency rulemaking. While providing an exhaustive description of each
category is far beyond the scope of this Comment, this Section
nevertheless begins with a broad discussion of the issues necessary to
understand the intersection of the RFS and modern Commerce Clause
jurisprudence following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sebelius.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See infra Section I.A. and Section I.B.
See infra Section I.C.
See infra Section I.D.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B. and Section II.C.
See infra Conclusion.
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A. The Oil Industry: A Primer
Without context, the RFS is nothing but another complex set of
regulations in a legislative universe chock full of confusing statutes.
But beyond the technical gobbledygook, the RFS is an extremely
influential piece of legislation with profound effects on the U.S.
economy. Understanding its relevance requires first a brief discussion
of the absolute basics of the oil industry and how petroleum refining
fits into the domestic transportation sector.
1.

The ongoing reign of fossil fuels
As of 2018, most of the energy consumed annually in the United States
derives from fossil fuels.35 While these fossil fuels supply key inputs for
manufacturing and heating, they are most commonly associated with
transportation.36 Despite the growing popularity of electric, hybrid, and
alternative-fuel vehicles,37 approximately ninety-two percent of private
and commercial vehicles still use petroleum as a fuel source.38
The most common petroleum-based fuels used in the transportation
sector are gasoline and diesel.39 Both products derive from crude oil,
a mixture of hydrocarbons in liquid form40 that companies rip from
the earth using various drilling, pumping, and extraction methods.41
Once pulled from the ground and delivered to refining facilities, oil

35. See Our Energy Sources:
Fossil Fuels, NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENG’G, MED.,
http://needtoknow.nas.edu/energy/energy-sources/fossil-fuels (last visited Dec. 3,
2018) (noting that the United States utilizes fossil fuels for roughly eighty-one percent
of its total energy expenditure).
36. See Fossil Fuel Energy Primary Consumption in the U.S. from 1990 to 2018, by Sector, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/244429/us-fossil-fuel-energy-consumption-by-sector (last
visited Dec. 3, 2018) (graphing the use of fossil fuel as an energy source across industries).
37. See, e.g., Alternative Fuel Vehicle Data, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 9, 2018),
https://www.eia.gov/renewable/afv (charting the increase in alternative-fueled vehicle
inventories among state and federal agencies between 2011 and 2016); Robert Rapier, U.S.
Electric Vehicle Sales Soared in 2016, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2017, 11:28 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2017/02/05/u-s-electric-vehicle-sales-soared-in-2016.
38. Use of Energy in the United States Explained: Energy Use for Transportation, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: ENERGY EXPLAINED, https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/?
page=us_energy_transportation (last updated May 23, 2018).
39. Id.
40. Oil: Crude and Petroleum Products Explained: Basics, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.:
ENERGY EXPLAINED, https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=oil_home
(last updated June 19, 2018) [hereinafter Oil Explained].
41. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TRENDS IN U.S. OIL AND NATURAL GAS UPSTREAM
COSTS 1–3 (2016), https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/drilling/pdf/upstream.pdf
(summarizing the costs of various extraction methods).
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refiners break the mixture of crude oil into separate batches of discrete
compounds using a process called “fractional distillation.”42 During
this process, refining instruments heat crude oil until the constituent
compounds reach their individual boiling points.43 Collected in a
tiered structure called a distillation column,44 these subsidiary products—
which exhibit markedly different chemical characteristics45—are then
used in blending to create finished transportation fuels or utilized as
feedstock for other industrial and manufacturing purposes.46 The base
forms of gasoline, collectively known as “blendstock,” are but a few of the
products derived from this basic oil distillation process.47
For gasoline, in particular, what comes directly from the refinery is
not what ultimately fuels an automobile. Before motorists pump
gasoline into their cars and trucks, marketers and suppliers mix
gasoline blendstock sourced from refineries with ethanol48 to reduce the
resulting emissions.49 Although the addition of ethanol slightly reduces
the efficiency of gasoline,50 ethanol-blended gasoline nevertheless now
makes up approximately ninety-five percent of all the fuel used by motor
vehicles with gasoline engines in the United States.51

42. See Jack Brubaker, How Does Fractional Distillation Work?, SCIENCING (Mar. 13,
2018), https://sciencing.com/fractional-distillation-work-6310159.html (defining
fractional distillation as “a modified distillation process that allows the separation of
liquids with similar boiling points”).
43. Id.
44. Crude Oil Distillation and the Definition of Refinery Capacity, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN.: TODAY IN ENERGY, (July 5, 2012), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.
php?id=6970.
45. See id. (detailing the products refined from crude oil and their varying boiling points).
46. Id.; see also Oil Explained, supra note 40 (explaining that industrial and
manufacturing uses of crude oil “fractions” include the production of plastics,
polyurethane, and many other goods).
47. See Definitions, Sources and Explanatory Notes, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.:
PETROLEUM & OTHER LIQUIDS, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/TblDefs/pet_move_
wkly_tbldef2.asp (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (defining various crude oil derivatives as
“gasoline blending components”).
48. Almost All U.S. Gasoline is Blended with 10% Ethanol, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.:
TODAY IN ENERGY, (May 4, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?
id=26092 [hereinafter U.S. Gasoline].
49. See How Much Ethanol is in Gasoline, and How Does it Affect Fuel Economy?, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, https://www.eia.gov/tools/
faqs/faq.php?id=27&t=10 (last updated June 12, 2018).
50. Id. (stating that the use of ethanol-blended gasoline may decrease fuel
economy by approximately three percent when compared to the use of pure gasoline).
51. See U.S. Gasoline, supra note 48.
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While this basic explanation overlooks many nuances of the fuel chain
and greatly oversimplifies the production scheme, a more thorough and
detailed explanation is beyond the scope of this Comment. Still, it is
important to keep in mind two important realities: (1) most of the
transportation fuel used in the United States derives from petroleum,
and (2) before gasoline reaches the tank, federal law mandates that
intermediaries blend it with ethanol to reduce pollution. How and
when fuel blending takes place is key to understanding how the RFS
functions, requiring a brief explanation of the oil refining industry.
2.

Oil refining and fuel blending
Both oil refining and the blending of petroleum products into finished
transportation and heating fuel takes place in the “downstream” portion
of an industry, generally split into three segments: upstream, midstream,
and downstream.52
The upstream segment includes the physical exploitation of
petroleum resources, usually through oil exploration, drilling, and the
actual removal of crude oil from the ground.53 By comparison, crude
oil and natural gas transportation via truck, barge, and pipeline
generally characterizes the midstream sector.54 However, most relevant
to the RFS is the downstream sector, where the actual oil refining
process takes place.55
Unlike the upstream and midstream segments, the downstream
sector is best understood as two distinct halves.56 In what might be
called the “upper” half of the downstream sector, companies utilize
massive oil refining assets to convert physical crude oil and feedstock
to petroleum products like gasoline blendstocks, diesel, blending

52. See Industry Overview, PSAC, https://www.psac.ca/business/industry-overview
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (dividing the oil and gas industry into the three main
components and describing each).
53. See id. (noting that the upstream industry is referred to as the “exploration and
production (E&P) sector”).
54. See id. (dubbing the midstream segment the “vital link” between remote oil
production areas and consumers).
55. See id. (listing “oil refineries, petrochemical plants, petroleum products
distributors, retail outlets and natural gas distribution companies” as part of the
downstream industry).
56. See Michael Teague, Major Integrated Oil & Gas: Standard Oil, Super-Majors, and
Resource
Nationalism,
EQUITIES.COM
(Feb.
6,
2014,
9:28
AM),
https://www.equities.com/news/major-integrated-oil-gas-from-super-majors-toresource-nationalism (separating the tasks of downstream refiners into processing
resources and handling aspects of the sale of goods).
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components like naphtha, and even asphalt.57 The second, “lower,”
half of the downstream sector includes the blending, marketing,
delivery, and terminal distribution of finished transportation fuel,
heating fuel, and jet fuel.58 While many of the largest oil companies
maintain an asset presence in each segment of the industry,59 the RFS
is most impactful among refiners and blenders in the downstream
segment, where the compliance burden falls. Here, the origins and
innerworkings of the RFS become immediately relevant to
understanding the financial footprint of this compliance burden.
B. The Renewable Fuel Standard
At its most basic, the RFS simply reflects Congress’s intent to
incentivize the production and use of cleaner, more efficient fuels.60
Like many statutes currently in force, the RFS evolved through
amendment and revision.
1.

Birth of the RFS: The Energy Policy Act and the Clean Air Act
In passing the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress supplemented
the existing Clean Air Act61 by instituting a “renewable fuel program.”62
In its introduction, the Energy Policy Act evinced a shift in policy
aimed at reducing the United States’ reliance on foreign energy,63
increasing the efficiency of existing energy sources,64 and supporting a
push for a diversified fuel production.65 Notably, the Energy Policy Act

57. See Oil Explained, supra note 40 (cataloging the average distillation yield of a
forty-two-gallon barrel of crude oil); see also Michael Freemantle, What’s that Stuff?:
Asphalt, CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS (Nov. 22, 1999), https://pubs.acs.org/cen/whatstuff/
stuff/7747scit6.html (tying the source of asphalt to the petroleum refining process).
58. See Industry Overview, supra note 52 and accompanying text.
59. See Teague, supra note 56 (specifying ExxonMobil, Chevron, and BP as vertically
integrated oil companies with asset footprints across all three industry segments).
60. See 151 Cong. Rec. H6,960 (statement of Rep. Joe Burton) (explaining that
“[t]here are numerous provisions in this bill to give incentives to renewable and clean
energy resources, there are numerous provisions in this bill to increase the efficient
use of those resources); c.f. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L.
No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492, 1492 (2007) (declaring in the Act’s preamble the
congressional intent to “increase the production of clean renewable fuels”).
61. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
62. Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1501, 119 Stat. 594, 1067 (establishing the general
parameters of the RFS).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 16181(a)(3) (2012).
64. Id. § 16181(a)(1).
65. Id. § 16181(a)(2).
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included a provision that set forth renewable fuel blending
requirements66 for petroleum refiners and importers67 and established
annual volume requirements68 for qualifying renewable fuel types. For
compliance purposes, the RFS69 designated all refiners and importers
as “obligated parties”70 and required the blending of renewable fuels
directly proportionate to petroleum production or importation.71
In 2007, Congress passed the Energy Independence and Security Act
(EISA),72 which expanded the qualifying types of renewable fuels73 and
increased the blending obligations for petroleum refiners and
importers.74 The result was a second, modernized RFS that requires
producers and importers to blend, as a means of compliance with
regulatory targets, one or more of four statutorily recognized renewable

66. See id. §§ 7545(o)(2)(A)(ii), 7545(o)(2)(B)(i) (authorizing the Secretary of
Energy to promulgate regulations necessary to ensure that “gasoline sold or
introduced into commerce in the United States . . . , on an annual average basis,”
contains applicable volumes of renewable fuel in annually increasing amounts from
2006 to 2012).
67. Id. § 7545(o)(3)(B)(ii)(I) (specifying that the renewable fuel obligation shall
“be applicable to refineries, blenders, and importers”). But see 40 C.F.R. § 80.1106(a)(1)
(2017) (clarifying that the renewable volume obligation does not apply to blenders, since
they are “part[ies] that simply add[ ] renewable fuel to gasoline”).
68. The Energy Policy Act mandated the blending of 4.0 billion gallons of
renewable fuel in 2006; 4.7 billion gallons in 2007; 5.4 billion gallons in 2008; 6.1
billion gallons in 2009; 6.8 billion gallons in 2010; 7.4 billion gallons in 2011; and 7.5
billion gallons in 2012. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i).
69. Id. § 7545(o).
70. See id. § 7545(o)(3)(B)(ii)(I) (applying renewable fuel obligations to
“refineries” and “importers”); 40 C.F.R. § 80.1106(a)(1) (restating that “[a]n obligated
party is a refiner that produces gasoline within the 48 contiguous states, or an importer
that imports gasoline into the 48 contiguous states”).
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(3)(B)(ii)(II) (establishing that each refiner or
importer’s obligation takes the form of a “percentage of [gasoline] sold or introduced
into commerce in the United States”).
72. Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
73. See 121 Stat. at 1519 (adding “advanced biofuel” as a qualifying renewable fuel
and generally characterizing the fuel as ethanol and biodiesel deriving from a source
other than corn starch).
74. See Summary of the Energy Independence and Security Act, EPA: LAWS & REGS.,
https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-energy-independence-and-securityact (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (summarizing the policy changes effectuated by the EISA
by the introduction of “more aggressive requirements”).
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fuels:75 conventional renewable fuel (“D6”);76 advanced biofuel (“D5”);77
cellulosic biofuel (“D3”);78 and biomass-based diesel (“D4”).79
Most recently, reports in October 2018 indicate that some form of
RFS revision is forthcoming,80 as the EPA is expected to release a
proposed rule concerning RINs in February 2019, with the final rule
expected in May 2019.81 However, despite initial characterizations of
these changes as a “broad overhaul,”82 there is no suggestion that
expected changes will modify the governing compliance system at the
heart of the RFS. To the contrary, advance reports suggest that imminent
revision may simply reduce the number of waivers available to refineries
unable to meet their compliance obligations.83 Indeed, following a May
2018 meeting with White House officials, an oil industry representative
criticized the impending policy changes as inadequate.84 Accordingly,

75. See Renewable Fuel Annual Standards, EPA: RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD PROGRAM,
https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-program/renewable-fuel-annual-standar
ds (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (providing basic definitions and example feedstocks for each
recognized renewable fuel within the “nesting scheme” of the new RFS).
76. Conventional renewable fuel, commonly known as ethanol, derives from corn
starch. See id.
77. Advanced biofuel derives from sugarcane and other fermented sugars. See id.
78. Cellulosic biofuel results from the processing of corn stalks, leaves, and cobs
(as opposed to the corn kernels themselves), wood chips, and biogas. See id.
79. Biomass-based diesel derives from soybean oil, canola oil, waste oil, and animal
fats. See id.
80. See Erin Voegele, OMB Releases Estimated Timelines for EPA’s E15 Rule, 2 RFS
Rules, ETHANOL PRODUCER MAG. (Oct. 18, 2018), http://www.ethanolproducer.com/
articles/15698/omb-releases-estimated-timelines-for-epaundefineds.
81. See Modifications to Fuel Regulations to Provide Flexibility for E15; Modifications to
RFS RIN Market Regulations, Off. Info. & Reg. Aff., https://www.reginfo.gov
/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201810&RIN=2060-AU34 (last visited Dec. 3,
2018) (listing expected dates for proposed and final rules concerning “regulatory
changes [modifying] certain elements of the renewable identification number (RIN)
compliance system under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program”).
82. See Jarrett Renshaw & Chris Prentice, Trump Biofuel Policy Overhaul to Include
Fewer Refinery Waivers: Source, REUTERS (May 11, 2018, 1:20 PM), https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-usa-trump-biofuels/trump-biofuel-policy-overhaul-to-include-fewerrefinery-waivers-source-idUSKBN1IC263?il=0 (detailing the Trump Administration’s
soon-expected structural changes to the RFS).
83. See id. (expecting cuts to the numbers of waivers the EPA may give to small
refiners who produce less than 75,000 barrels of fuel per day).
84. See Snow, infra note 187 (“We . . . believe that small refiner exemptions are
evidence that the RFS is broken and comprehensive legislative reforms, including a
sunset of the program, are needed.”).
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barring any unexpected shift in directive, it appears the current
administration intends to keep the core goals of the RFS intact.85
The RFS achieves these policy goals through a uniquely structured
compliance system that requires producers to fulfill individualized
obligations at the close of each fiscal year.86 How the RFS determines
these obligations requires a brief detour into the finer details of the
RFS’s compliance regulations.
2.

The RFS compliance framework
The RFS not only specifies the parties that must adhere to its
renewable fuels policies; it also dictates how they may demonstrate
compliance. To this end, the RFS vests in the EPA the power to
determine annual Renewable Volume Obligations (“RVOs”), which
each obligated party accrues based on their petroleum production or
import activities.87 Functionally, the EPA computes these RVOs by
drawing a direct relationship between the annual gallons produced or
imported by an obligated party and the renewable volume that entity
must produce to offset.88 To calculate each individual obligation, the
RFS sets forth annual national volume mandates for each type of
renewable fuel.89 The EPA then converts this nationwide volume to a
percentage basis for each biofuel using gasoline and diesel fuel
consumption projections for the forthcoming year derived from
U.S. Energy Information Administration statistics.90 Each refiner

85. See Renshaw & Prentice, supra note 80 (clarifying that regardless of the use of
waivers, the Trump Administration intends to ensure there is no effect to “the amount
of biofuels blended” overall).
86. Overview for Renewable Fuel Standard:
Program Compliance Basics, EPA:
RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD PROGRAM, https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standardprogram/overview-renewable-fuel-standard (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) [hereinafter
Program Compliance Basics].
87. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7545(o)(2)(A)(i), (iii)(I) (2012) (requiring that the EPA
promulgate compliance regulations covering “refineries, blenders, distributors, and
importers”); see also 40 C.F.R. § 80.1106(a)(1) (2017) (indicating that refiners and
importers are obligated parties, but blenders are not).
88. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.1107(a) (defining an obligated party’s RVO as a function of
the RFS-mandated total volume for a specified calendar year and the volume of nonrenewable fuel produced or imported by that party for the same calendar year).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i) (setting forth the nationwide volume
mandates for all four recognized categories of renewable fuel by year until 2022).
90. See § 7545(o)(3)(A) (stating that the Energy Information Administration must
provide an estimate of the projected volume of gasoline sales for the next calendar
year). See generally Program Compliance Basics, supra note 86 (explaining that the EPA
calculates RVOs based on gasoline production estimates for the following year).
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“multiplies the percentage RFS for each biofuel times its combined
petroleum gasoline and diesel fuel production and arrives at the RVO
for each biofuel.”91
Once established, an obligated party has two options: (1) blend
renewable fuels into transportation or heating fuels to offset its RVO,
or (2) secure compliance credits as a substitute for actual blending
efforts.92 Under either option, the means to demonstrate compliance
take the form of statutorily created credits called Renewable
Identification Numbers (RINs).93
a. RINs
Ultimately, RINs are just thirty-eight-character numeric codes
identifying various characteristics related to the RINs’ creation.94 Every
time any party produces or imports into the United States a qualifying
renewable fuel under the RFS, that party generates a RIN.95 The RIN
generation process occurs simultaneously with the production or
importation of the associated “batch”96 of biofuel at no additional cost
to the producer;97 only producers and importers that create or import
less than 10,000 gallons of renewable fuel each year are exempt from
this RINs generation process.98 These RINs, which travel with the

91. Bob Neufeld & Rebecca Lynne Fey, Winners and Losers: The EPA’s Unfair
Implementation of Renewable Fuel Standards, 60 S.D. L. REV. 258, 264 n.15 (2015); see also
40 C.F.R. § 80.1107 (providing the exact calculation for an obligated party’s RVO).
92. Program Compliance Basics, supra note 86; see also Renewable Identification Numbers
(RINs) Under the Renewable Fuel Standard, EPA: RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD PROGRAM,
https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-program/renewable-identificationnumbers-rins-under-renewable-fuel-standard (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (modeling the
holistic, generation-to-retirement regime employed by obligated parties who also
blend renewable fuels and illustrating, by contrast, the necessity for non-blending
obligated parties to purchase separated RINs to meet compliance obligations).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(5)(A) (establishing the credit program); 40 C.F.R.
§ 80.1125 (describing the basic coding format for RINs).
94. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.1125(a)–(i) (identifying the features incorporated into the
RIN codes, including the type of renewable fuel, the year the fuel was produced or
imported, and the registration number of the refiner or importer).
95. See id. § 80.1126(a)(1).
96. Under the RFS, a “batch” is simply any volume of renewable fuel as designated
by the specific RIN code. Id. § 80.1126(c).
97. See id. § 80.1426(e)(2).
98. See id. § 80.1126(b).
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physical biofuel at the point of sale,99 are ultimately the offset credits
used for compliance under the RFS.100
Each RIN is valid only in the year it was produced or in the year
immediately following, and all RINs expire immediately after an
obligated party uses them for compliance.101 Of the four types of
RINs,102 those generated by the blending of ethanol into gasoline
blendstock are by far the most ubiquitous and, as a result, most
commonly traded.103
Known colloquially by their regulatory
designation as D6 RINs, ethanol compliance credits make up the
largest portion, in sheer volume, of the renewable fuels mandate.104
Perhaps mindful that not all obligated parties would choose to blend
renewable fuels as a means to demonstrate compliance, Congress
fostered a secondary RIN market by allowing any RIN-generating party
to transfer the credits to another.105 Congress also authorized the EPA
to issue regulations permitting “the generation of . . . credits by any
person that refines, blends, or imports gasoline that contains a quantity
of renewable fuel that is greater than the quantity required” to satisfy

99. See id. (“A RIN is assigned to a volume of renewable fuel when ownership of
the RIN is transferred along with the transfer of the volume of renewable fuel . . . .”).
100. See id. § 80.1428(a)(1) (clarifying that the RINs assigned to volumes of
renewable fuel for compliance purposes are those “gallon-RINs” generated through
§ 80.1426(e)).
101. Id. § 80.1127(a)(3).
102. The designation ties the RIN to the underlying renewable fuel whose blending
produced it. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text (outlining the renewable
fuel types and the origins of each).
103. See Annual RIN Sales Report, EPA: FUELS REGISTRATION, REPORTING, &
COMPLIANCE HELP, https://www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reporting-and-compliancehelp/rin-trades-and-price-information (click on the “Data Sets” dropdown box to
change the displayed report; select “RIN Transaction Volumes”; click on “Total RINs
Traded” to organize from most to least) (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (showing that D6
ethanol RINs traded at far higher volumes than other renewable fuel credits between
2010 and 2018).
104. Of the approximately 23.85 billion gallons of renewable fuel the EPA required
for blending in 2016, ethanol made up 18.11 billion gallons, or nearly seventy-six
percent of the total mandate. Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016,
and the Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for 2017, EPA: RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD PROGRAM,
https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-program/final-renewable-fuel-standar
ds-2014-2015-and-2016-and-biomass-based (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(5)(B), (E) (2012) (expressly permitting the transfer of
compliance credits and authorizing the EPA to promulgate regulations governing the
exchange and use of the credits).
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that party’s RVO.106 In so doing, Congress both anticipated and
provided for the existence of a separate financial market involving
compliance credits.107
b. The secondary compliance market
Any party that registers with the EPA may trade RINs,108 which seems
worthless because of their intangibility but nonetheless have intrinsic
value because any obligated party may use the credits to satisfy its
annual RVO.109 Accordingly, RINs change hands frequently in a
secondary market,110 exposing RIN prices to volatility based on
fundamental influences like supply and demand as well as more
esoteric drivers such as trading sentiment and market speculation.111
This exposure to third-party speculation appears the likeliest candidate
for regulatory attention, as the Trump Administration in October 2018
announced that it had directed the EPA to consider reforms aimed at
“increas[ing] transparency and prevent[ing] price manipulation in the

106. § 7545(o)(5)(A)(i) (emphasis added); see also § 7545(o)(5)(A)(ii)
(authorizing the same generation of extra credits for blending efforts exceeding
biodiesel obligations).
107. In its final rulemaking, the EPA explained:
Under the RFS program the trading provisions comprise an integral element
of compliance. Many obligated parties do not have access to renewable fuels
or the ability to blend them, and so must use credits to comply. The RFS
trading program is also unique in that the parties liable for meeting the
standard (refiners, importers, and blenders of gasoline) are not generally the
parties who make the renewable fuels or blend them into gasoline. This
creates the need for trading mechanisms that ensure that the means to
demonstrate compliance will be readily available for use by obligated parties.
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 72 Fed.
Reg. 23,900, 23,904 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
108. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.1428(b)(2) (2012) (permitting any person registered per
EPA requirements to “own a separated RIN”).
109. See id. § 80.1127(a).
110. See, e.g., ARGUS, ARGUS AMERICAS BIOFUELS, ISSUE 18-121 1–4 (2018),
https://www.argusmedia.com/-/media/Files/sample-reports/argus-americasbiofuels-report (detailing the trading in D6 ethanol RINs, D4 biomass-based diesel
RINs, and D3 cellulosic RINs over a single day in June 2018).
111. See, e.g., Tristan R. Brown, Ballparking Valero’s Future RIN Costs, SEEKINGALPHA
(Aug. 15, 2017), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4099047-ballparking-valerosfuture-rin-costs (discussing the volatility of the RINs market and its impact on Valero,
a major oil refiner and obligated party under the RFS scheme).
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RIN market.”112 Among the proposed reforms, the Trump Administration
announced that it encouraged the EPA to consider prohibiting any entity
other than obligated parties from purchasing RINs, requiring public
disclosure of RIN holdings at a certain volume threshold, placing a time
limit on third-party possession of RINs, and mandating the real-time
retirement of RINs for compliance purposes.113
Current regulatory proposals notwithstanding, the RIN market’s
current exposure to speculative influence has a tendency to exacerbate
the price effects of shifts in supply and demand, often resulting in
sharp moves in RIN prices and, by extension, the compliance costs for
obligated parties seeking to satisfy their RVOs with purchased
credits.114
Additionally, even if one or more of the Trump
Administration’s regulatory proposals were to survive the notice and
comment process intact,115 a diverse range of obligated parties would still
populate the RIN market, making the elimination of all speculative
influence impossible. Regardless of market composition, because some
obligated parties produce RINs as a natural consequence of their business
model,116 those parties who do not are faced with a difficult reality.
c.

Compliance burdens among oil refiners

Although the RFS places an obligation on both parties, it is
ultimately refiners, not importers, that shoulder the bulk of the
compliance burden under the RFS.117 Furthermore, under the RFS,

112. President Donald J. Trump is Expanding Waivers for E15 and Increasing Transparency in the
RIN Market, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trump-expanding-waivers-e15-increasing-transparency-rin-market.
113. See id.
114. See id. (attributing Valero’s 2017 RIN costs of approximately $850 million to
strong volatility in the RINs market).
115. Although a nuanced analysis of the Trump Administration’s directives and
proposed EPA rulemaking is beyond the scope of this comment, many of the proposals
seem likely to attract scrutiny from financial interests and legal theorists alike.
Categorically barring or severely limiting market access to selected actors could have
more direct Commerce Clause implications.
116. See infra Section I.B.2.c.i (summarizing the vertically integrated refiner
business model).
117. In 2016, importers retired approximately 343 million D6 ethanol RINs to satisfy
compliance obligations, while refiners retired over 12 billion D6 ethanol RINs for the
same compliance year. See Annual Compliance Data for Obligated Parties and Renewable Fuel
Exporters Under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program, EPA: FUELS REGISTRATION,
REPORTING, & COMPLIANCE HELP (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/fuelsregistration-reporting-and-compliance-help/annual-compliance-data-obligated-partiesand#refiner.
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not all oil refiners are created equal. Refiners vary in business model
due to organizational differences and geographic realities. Parties
most affected by the RINs scheme are thus separated into two distinct
camps: vertically integrated refiners and independent refiners.
Vertically integrated refiners
Vertically integrated refiners are companies that engage in fuel
blending in addition to their oil refining operations.118 For these
companies, the RVOs incurred in the production of oil products are
naturally offset by the refiner’s blending of those products into
finished fuels for sale through retail distribution assets like branded
retail fuel stations.119 By regulatory design, this offset process is, in
many respects, unavoidable because almost all of the gasoline sold in
the United States today contains ethanol.120
It is even possible for the retail obligations of vertically integrated
refiners to exceed their refining capacity.121 In such situations, vertically
integrated refiners must purchase gasoline blendstocks from refiners
with limited or no downstream assets on an as-needed basis to cover
their retail exposure.122 In this arrangement, vertically integrated
refiners blend petroleum products that they did not create, permitting
the generation of RINs with no underlying renewable volume
obligation.123 This allows the vertically integrated refiner to sell RINs
independent of the blended fuel, oftentimes back to the same refiners
who sold them the enabling blendstock.124 Additionally, this advantage
offers the vertically integrated refiner another potential revenue stream,

118. See Maria Kielmas, Stages of Vertical Integration in the US Oil Industry, CHRON,
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/stages-vertical-integration-oil-industry-58830.html
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (explaining the history of vertical integration, beginning
with John D. Rockefeller and Standard Oil).
119. Id.
120. See U.S. Gasoline, supra note 48 (explaining that “more than [ninety-five
percent] of the fuel consumed in motor vehicles with gasoline engines” in the United
States is petroleum-based gasoline mixed with ten percent ethanol).
121. See Neufeld & Fey, supra note 91, at 262–63 (detailing how the nationwide
reach of large-scale vertically integrated companies exhausts their petroleum
production).
122. See id. at 264–65 (discussing the “symbiotic relationship” between vertically
integrated refiners and independent refiners that produce petroleum to sell to other
refiners instead of public consumers).
123. Id. at 265.
124. Id. at 264–65.
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creating a market distortion that prior academic scholarship has termed
a “wealth transfer.”125
Independent refiners
Independent refiners are companies that maintain oil refining
operations but do not extend their business to blending and
downstream distribution of finished fuels products.126
Rather,
independent refiners sell the fruits of their refining efforts to thirdparty blenders and distributors.127 Unlike their vertically integrated
counterparts, independent refiners do not blend the fuels they refine,
forcing them to purchase RINs to satisfy their RVOs.128 Independent
refiners have absolutely no alternative to purchasing RINs for
compliance, short of changing their business model entirely.129
Moreover, the penalty for noncompliance is steep, with EPA
regulations charging obligated parties $32,500 for every day the party
remains in violation of its annual RVO.130 Thus, independent refiners,
because of their business model alone, face greater financial exposure
under the RFS framework.131
Most importantly, independent refiners’ inability to generate RINs
compels their participation in the statutorily created secondary market
125. Id. at 267 (detailing how the RIN compliance scheme brings about a revenue
transfer from independent refiners to vertically integrated refiners).
126. See, e.g., Andrew Maykuth, Why Philly Oil Refiners Want to Dump Ethanol Mandates,
PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 7, 2017, 3:52 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/business/
energy/oil-refiners-want-rfs-waiver-epa-ethanol-mandateners-campaign-to-relax-ethan
ol-mandates-20171107.html (naming Philadelphia Energy Solutions, Monroe Energy,
and PBF Energy as three independent refiners in the northeastern United States that
operate refineries but do not blend their fuel products, and thus must purchase RINs
on the secondary market to achieve RFS compliance).
127. See id. (clarifying that refiners like Philadelphia Energy Solutions sell
unblended fuel to distributors, who often blend at remote locations just prior to
distribution for retail sale).
128. See, e.g., Cezary Podkul, The Tally Is In: Ethanol “Blend Wall” Cost Refiners at Least
$1.35 Billion, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2014, 8:25 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usrins-spike-costs-analysis/the-tally-is-in-ethanol-blend-wall-cost-refiners-at-least-1-35billion-idUSBREA2U0PT20140331 (evaluating total RIN costs for refiners in 2013 and
confirming previously held industry hypotheses that refiners without the means to
blend their own fuel are forced to pay much greater sums to meet annual RVOs).
129. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.1127(a)(1) (2017) (stipulating that each obligated party
must demonstrate that it has acquired ownership of RINs sufficient to satisfy its RVO).
130. See id. § 80.1163(a) (citing the Clean Air Act as authority for the imposition of
civil penalties).
131. See Podkul, supra note 128 (reporting that non-blending refiners in 2013 paid
$1.35 billion for RINs).
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for the compliance credits—a reality that has serious ramifications
because of the limitations of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
C. The Commerce Clause
The Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.”132 In practice, Congress interprets this grant of authority
broadly, including within its scope the power to regulate matters both
superficially commercial, like the growing of wheat,133 as well as
activities less intuitively connected to trade, such as the interstate
transportation of kidnapping victims.134
While the Supreme Court has approved this liberal construction of
the Commerce Clause, the Court nevertheless requires that any activity
regulated have a “substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce.”135 However, even if an activity does not have a direct
economic impact on interstate commerce, Congress may nevertheless
regulate it if there is a rational basis that the “total incidence” of the
activity in the aggregate substantially affects commerce.136 Thus, while
Congress may exert legislative control over the intrastate growing of
crops for private use on the justification that the activity ultimately
affects interstate trade,137 the Court has held that activities that bear
only a tenuous connection to commerce, like the possession of a
firearm in a school zone, cannot be upheld under the Commerce
Clause.138 In distinguishing the two scenarios, the Supreme Court
separates inherently economic activity from non-economic activity,
with the former justifying Commerce Clause regulation based on its

132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
133. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (announcing that Congress may
regulate an activity that is local in character and not commercial in isolation under the
Commerce Clause “if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce”).
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012) (invoking the Commerce Clause as the constitutional
basis for the federal criminalization of kidnapping); see also United States v. Ochoa, No.
8-CR-1980 WJ, 2009 WL 3878520, at *1 (D.N.M. Nov. 12, 2009) (upholding 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201 as a valid extension of Congress’s Commerce Clause power).
135. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146, 151 (1971)).
136. Id. (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 154).
137. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
138. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 as an impermissible extension of Congress’s Commerce
Clause power).
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aggregate impact139 and the latter subject to limitation by the principles
of federalism, particularly when the regulation involves an area
traditionally left to the states.140 This distinction between the
regulation of economic and non-economic activity is blurrier than ever
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sebelius.
Chief Justice Roberts’s Sebelius opinion
In Sebelius, the Supreme Court addressed a constitutional challenge
to the ACA.141 Enacted by Congress in 2010,142 the ACA was challenged
immediately after President Obama signed the bill into law, with an
original plaintiff group of thirteen states quickly joined by the National
Federation of Independent Business and several individuals.143 The
plaintiff group challenged two key provisions of the ACA, one of which
was the individual mandate requiring uninsured individuals to
purchase health insurance.144
Through the individual mandate of the ACA, Congress attempted to
incentivize the purchase of minimum healthcare coverage by
essentially forcing every citizen of the United States to make a choice:
purchase minimum insurance coverage or pay a penalty.145 In
challenging this requirement, the plaintiffs in Sebelius alleged that
Congress lacked constitutional power to enact such a mandate.146
Chief Justice Roberts, writing alone, opined that the individual
mandate could not be justified by Congress’s powers under the
1.

139. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127–29 (noting that the decision of one individual to
abstain from the marketplace in favor of growing his own crops, when considered in
the aggregate amid similar decisions by many others so situated, would have a
substantial effect on the interstate market for that product).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (civil remedy for
victims of gender-motivated violence); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (possession of firearms).
141. See 567 U.S. 519, 530–31 (2012) (majority opinion).
142. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
143. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 540.
144. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012) (“An applicable individual shall for each month
beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of that individual
who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such
month.”). The plaintiff group also challenged the expansion of Medicaid coverage to
adults above the federal poverty level. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012)
(expanding Medicaid eligibility to adults “whose income . . . does not exceed 133
percent of the poverty line”). However, only the Supreme Court’s opinion concerning
the individual mandate is relevant to this Comment.
145. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 539–40.
146. Id. at 540.
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Commerce Clause because it “[did] not regulate existing commercial
activity.”147 Instead, the individual mandate “compel[led] individuals
to become active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground
that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce.”148
Distinguishing the individual mandate from other legislative actions
justified by the Commerce Clause, Chief Justice Roberts made clear
that “[t]he Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not
to compel it.”149
The Court ultimately upheld the individual mandate as within
Congress’s power to tax and spend,150 but while that segment of Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion commanded a majority of Justices, his
Commerce Clause-based invalidation did not.151
Thus, some
controversy exists as to whether Roberts’s declaration that Congress
may not compel market participation as an extension of its Commerce
Clause power is binding precedent or dicta.152
2.

Notable post-Sebelius Commerce Clause challenges
In the aftermath of the Sebelius decision, several plaintiffs have
attempted to extend the logic of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion to
challenge various other acts of Congress that allegedly compel market
participation. Of these challenges, three sets of cases bear mention.

147. Id. at 552 (Roberts, C.J.).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 555.
150. See id. at 574 (majority opinion) (finding that the individual mandate “may
reasonably be characterized as a tax” and that it was not the Court’s role “to forbid it, or
to pass upon its wisdom or fairness”); see also supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text.
151. See id. at 589 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) (recognizing the individual mandate as a valid provision
under the Commerce Clause).
152. See, e.g., Jeremy Kreisberg, Updated: Applying NFIB v. Sebelius in the Federal
Circuits: Analysis of the Case Law, HARV. L.: BILL OF HEALTH (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2013/11/18/applying-nfib-v-sebelius-in-thefederal-circuits-analysis-of-the-case-law (acknowledging “that it is not clear whether the
Court’s ‘decision’ on the Commerce Clause is binding on future courts”); Lawrence
B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1,
21–23 (2013) (explaining confusion surrounding Justice Roberts’s Commerce Clause
determination in Sebelius); Ilya Somin, A Simple Solution to the Holding vs. Dictum Mess,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 2, 2012, 3:47 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/07/02/asimple-solution-to-the-holding-vs-dictum-mess (arguing that the Supreme Court is the
ultimate arbiter of whether something is a holding or dictum; failure to defer to the
Court could lead lower courts to simply dismiss holdings they do not agree with).
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a. The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
Many defendants accused of sex crimes have challenged the
constitutionality of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA),153 creating a category of cases with the same narrow holding
concerning post-Sebelius Commerce Clause jurisprudence.154 The
unifying argument in these matters is perhaps best illustrated by United
States v. Lott,155 in which the defendant, a sex offender, argued that
Chief Justice Roberts’s Commerce Clause holding in Sebelius prevented
Congress from compelling sex offenders to proactively register in a
nationwide database.156 The United States District Court for the
District of Vermont acknowledged that Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
provided no real guidance for how a lower court might distinguish
activity and inactivity or between market regulation and compulsion.157
Nevertheless, the district court ultimately upheld SORNA by
recognizing that Sebelius did not affect Congress’s “power to regulate
intrastate activity when so doing is incidental” to legislation regulating
criminal matters incapable of isolation to a single state.158
b. Other criminal prohibitions
Like SORNA, other criminal statutes penalize actions on the theory
that a lack of sanction will deleteriously affect interstate commerce. One
such statute, the Hobbs Act,159 uses the Commerce Clause as justification
for prohibiting robbery, extortion, or attempts to commit either.
Marshalling the logic of Sebelius, a defendant convicted for
conspiracy under the Hobbs Act challenged the statute’s
constitutionality in United States v. McLean.160 Reasoning that the
government “fabricate[d] a crime in a reverse sting operation,”161 the
153. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911–16962 (2012) (requiring all convicted sex offenders to
register in a national database and to notify select parties of their presence in certain areas).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Kiste, No. 3:12-CR-113 JD, 2013 WL 587556, at *1 (N.D.
Ind. Feb. 13, 2013); United States v. Stager, No. A-12-CR-350-SS, 2013 WL 12099883, at
*1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2013); United States v. Loudner, No. CR 12-30144-RAL, 2013 WL
357494, at *1 (D.S.D. Jan. 29, 2013), aff’d, 552 F. App’x 377 (5th Cir. 2014).
155. 912 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D. Vt. 2012), aff’d, 750 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2014).
156. See id. at 149 (asserting that the Commerce Clause opinion in Sebelius overruled
United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 2010), which upheld SORNA as a
valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause).
157. Id. at 154.
158. Id. at 155–56.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
160. 702 F. App’x 81 (3rd Cir. 2017).
161. Id. at 88.

692

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:667

defendant argued that Sebelius precluded federal authorities from
constructing conspiracies “that would have never occurred in the
absence of federal intervention.”162 The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed and upheld the conviction, reasoning that the
defendant took “affirmative acts toward conduct which, if carried out
as envisioned, would affect or potentially affect interstate
commerce.”163 Thus, the Third Circuit distinguished the Hobbs Act
from the ACA provision at issue in Sebelius, which proscribed the
compulsion of commercial activity, not Congress’s authority to
criminalize actions either planned or already undertaken.164
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
addressed a factually similar case involving a constitutional challenge
to a federal firearm prohibition statute in United States v. Spann.165
Ruling that Chief Justice Roberts’s Commerce Clause holding was
unavailable to a convicted felon seeking to purchase a firearm, the
district court held that Sebelius was inapposite because the statute did
“not compel individuals to act—let alone purchase a product—but
rather prohibit[ed] individuals from acting.”166
c.

The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act

In Goethel v. Pritzker,167 commercial fishermen challenged the
constitutionality of the actions of a regional extension of the National
Marine Fisheries Service.168 The regional agency, authorized by the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976
(MSA),169 required that third-party monitors accompany all commercial
fishermen in the Northeast United States.170 The provision required the
fishermen to pay for the costs of these monitors, whose job it was to
“collect certain data related to the particular fishing trip and the fishing

162. Id. at 87.
163. Id. at 88.
164. Id.
165. See United States v. Spann, No. 3:12-CR-126-L, 2012 WL 4341799, at *3 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 24, 2012) (assessing the validity of defendant’s post-Sebelius Commerce
Clause challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), aff’d, 562 F. App’x 237 (5th Cir. 2014).
166. Id.
167. No. 15-cv-497-JL, 2016 WL 4076831, at *1 (D.N.H. July 29, 2016), aff’d, 854 F.3d
106 (1st Cir. 2017).
168. Id. at *1–2.
169. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(5) (2012) (empowering regional offshoots of the
National Marine Fisheries Service to carry out monitoring activities).
170. Goethel, 2016 WL 4076831, at *2.
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vessels’ catch.”171 The plaintiffs argued that this “industry-funding
requirement” violated the Commerce Clause because “it compel[led]
sectors to enter contracts with private companies,” in contravention of
the Supreme Court’s holding in Sebelius.”172
The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire
held that the Sebelius ban did not apply because the MSA required
compulsory at-sea monitoring only for those vessels which engaged in
fishing activities in select sectors.173 Thus, because commercial
fishermen had the choice not to participate in the sector system and
instead “fish in the ‘common pool,’”174 the court held that “the costs of
monitors [were] part of the permissible regulation of plaintiffs’
commercial fishing activities.”175
Of course, most applications of Chief Justice Roberts’s Sebelius
holding have focused solely on federal statutes. The RFS, by
comparison, delegates to a federal agency the enforcement of its
provisions,176 bringing into play the trappings of administrative law.
D.

The Chevron Roadblock

While the RFS is a work of Congress, most of the authority guiding
the regulatory scheme of RINs derives not from the statute, but from
regulations promulgated by the EPA.177 Thus, whereas a litigant may
challenge the constitutionality of the RFS, the EPA’s interpretation of
the RFS mandate may warrant judicial deference per Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.178
At its core, Chevron deference stands for the proposition that courts
will defer to agency interpretations of statutory ambiguity when those

171. Id.
172. Id. at *7 (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 551
(2012) (Roberts, C.J.)).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (“[T]he Administrator shall promulgate
regulations to ensure that gasoline sold or introduced into commerce in the United
States . . . contains the applicable volume of renewable fuel . . . .”).
177. See Overview for Renewable Fuel Standard: Program Structure, EPA: RENEWABLE
FUEL
STANDARD
PROGRAM,
https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standardprogram/overview-renewable-fuel-standard (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (explaining that
the EPA, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Energy are responsible for
implementing the RFS).
178. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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interpretations are reasonable.179 In matters of agency interpretation
of a statute, courts follow the two-step test set forth in Chevron. First,
courts must determine whether the statute at issue is indeed
ambiguous; if it is not, the analysis ends.180 However, if the statute is
ambiguous, courts move to the second step and consider whether the
agency interpretation is reasonable.181
This standard is permissive rather than restrictive; matters of Chevron
deference typically turn on a question of whether an agency has strayed
beyond the confines of its statutory authority.182 Accordingly, a
challenge to any part of the RINs scheme rooted in EPA rulemaking,
and not the RFS itself, faces the tall order of overcoming Chevron; a
regime that accords deference to agency interpretation unless it is
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary” to the governing statute.183
II. ANALYSIS
This Comment brings together two disparate products of legislation
and judicial interpretation: the dysfunctional RFS and modern
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In merging these topics, this
Comment first summarizes how, despite numerous attempts at
revision, the issues plaguing the RFS remain unresolved. Next, this
Comment discusses previously suggested means of challenging or
avoiding the RFS to solidify that a constitutional challenge to the
governing statute is the best-possible solution. Finally, this Comment
concludes by arguing that, as a work of Congress, the RFS faces
invalidation on constitutional grounds because it violates Chief Justice
Roberts’s Commerce Clause holding in Sebelius, which, as binding
precedent, expressly prohibits the legislature from using the Commerce
Clause as justification for the compulsion of market activity. Thus,
because the RFS forces oil refiners with no fuel blending exposure to
enter a market for compliance credits, the regulatory scheme is uniquely
exposed to constitutional challenge on Sebelius grounds.

179. See id. at 844 (acknowledging that “a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency”).
180. Id. at 842–43.
181. Id.
182. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297–98 (2013) (“[T]he question . . . is
always whether the agency has gone beyond what Congress has permitted it to do . . . .”).
183. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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A. An Unresolved Problem
This Comment is hardly the first to recognize the shortcomings of
the RINs scheme and the RFS overall.184 However, while the program
has consistently attracted the ire of oil refiners,185 until 2018 no major
industry player had been able to cite RINs as anything more than an
added financial annoyance.186 However, with the financial collapse of
Philadelphia Energy Solutions, the RFS has entered a new era in which
its future no longer seems certain. Now that one of the largest oil
refiners in the United States has succumbed to financial burdens
imposed by the RFS, it seems increasingly unlikely that the RINs
compliance scheme will remain the status quo. Indeed, in the
aftermath of Philadelphia Energy Solutions’s demise, there has been a
new wave of calls for revision of the RFS.187
However, just how revision might take place is another question
entirely. Various methods of reworking, or dismantling, the RFS are
available, but the path of least resistance is a constitutional challenge
based on Chief Justice Roberts’s Commerce Clause holding in Sebelius.

184. E.g., Shannon S. Broome & Paul R. Esformes, Food v. Fuel: Are Legal Attacks on
the Renewable Fuel Standard Just a Bunch of Empty Calories?, 28 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T
33, 33 (2013) (summarizing RFS criticisms by meat producers that the shift in energy
focus from fossil fuels to corn-based ethanol indirectly causes an increase in food
prices); Neufeld & Fey, supra note 91, at 267 (analyzing the “wealth transfer” between
independent and vertically integrated oil refiners and competition distortion in the
industry as negative consequences of the RFS).
185. See Renewable Fuel Standard Facts, AM. PETROLEUM INST., www.api.org/oil-andnatural-gas/energy-primers/renewable-fuel-standards (last visited Dec. 3, 2018)
[hereinafter Renewable Fuel Standard Facts] (maintaining that the continued existence
of the RFS has “dire consequences for the broader economy, as well as negative
impacts on consumers”).
186. See Tim Fitzgibbon et al., Decoding the US Refiner’s Exposure to RINs, MCKINSEY & CO.
(Sep. 7, 2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/oil-and-gas/our-insights/decodingthe-us-refiners-exposure-to-rins (explaining that a RIN cost of $1 per gallon amounts to an
additional cost of $3 or $4 per barrel).
187. See, e.g., Nick Snow, API Official Sees Major Questions After White House Meeting,
OIL & GAS J. (May 14, 2018), https://www.ogj.com/articles/2018/05/api-official-seesmajor-questions-after-white-house-ethanol-meeting (detailing the oil industry’s
response to a 2018 meeting with White House officials, in which the Trump
Administration “did not offer adequate solutions to the [RFS’s] problems”); David
Holt, Time for Congress to Reform the Renewable Fuel Standard, REAL CLEAR ENERGY (Apr.
11, 2018), https://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2018/04/11/time_for_congress
_to_make_meaningful_fuel_standard_reform_110286.html (calling for a full reform
of the RFS); Merrill Matthews, Time to Rethink the Renewable Fuel Standard, THE HILL
(Feb. 15, 2018, 10:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/373912time-to-rethink-the-renewable-fuel-standard (arguing that the RFS is overdue for revision).
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B. Distinguishing Alternative Solutions
Certainly, a constitutional challenge is not the only avenue to
revising the RFS. To the contrary, arguing against a statute’s
constitutionality would seem a rather extreme response. However,
while other, more traditional remedial approaches are available, the
unique circumstances of the RFS—and the rare opportunity to utilize
a piece of Supreme Court jurisprudence that remains unsettled—
make a constitutional challenge the best option.
1.

Full legislative repeal of the RFS
Like any act of Congress, the RFS and its regulatory progeny are
subject to repeal at the whim of the legislature.188 This solution would
certainly cure the inefficiencies and flaws of the RINs scheme, but a
wholesale repeal is both highly unlikely and extreme.
To start, while the RFS has become a politically divisive program, its
authorizing statute resulted from bipartisan support in both houses of
the legislature.189 Admittedly, political headwinds have shifted
considerably since 2007,190 but opposition to the RFS is not consistent
across party lines,191 making it very difficult to expect any coalition vote
for repeal. Furthermore, while pressure from anti-RFS oil interests is
real,192 the RFS has been a boon for the corn industry,193 complicating
188. See Steven R. Pottle, Repeal the RFS, THE HILL (Feb. 17, 2015, 5:00 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-environment/232980-repeal-the-rfs
(discussing the congressional appetite to repeal the RFS).
189. See 153 CONG. REC. S15,432 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2007) (showing that H.R. 6, the
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, passed the Senate with eighty-six yeas
and just eight nays); 153 CONG. REC. H16,752 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2007) (showing that
H.R. 6 passed the House of Representatives on a vote of 314 yeas to 100 nays).
190. Compare MILDRED AMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22555, MEMBERSHIP OF THE
110TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE 1 (2008) (cataloging, for the 110th Congress, 239
Democrats and 200 Republicans in the House of Representatives and 49 Democrats
and 49 Republicans in the Senate), with JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R44762, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 115TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE 1 (2018) (listing, for the
115th Congress, 197 Democrats and 240 Republicans in the House of Representatives
and 51 Republicans and 47 Democrats in the Senate).
191. See Erin Voegele, Grassley: RFS Has Minimal Impact on Success of Refineries,
ETHANOL PRODUCER MAG. (Feb. 6, 2018), http://ethanolproducer.com/articles/
15022/grassley-rfs-has-minimal-impact-on-success-of-refineries (reporting on Senator
Chuck Grassley’s (R-Iowa) apprehension at blaming refinery losses on the RFS).
192. See Renewable Fuel Standard Facts, supra note 185 (referring to the RFS as a
“broken policy”).
193. See Communications in News, Celebrating a Decade of Success: The RFS Turns 10!,
RENEWABLE FUELS ASS’N (Aug. 6, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.ethanolrfa.org/2015/
08/celebrating-a-decade-of-success-the-rfs-turns-10 (noting that the number of corn

2018] CHALLENGING THE BROKEN RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD

697

a political calculus that, for some representatives, may have been
simpler prior to the adoption of the scheme. Admittedly, recent
developments suggest that Congress may be preparing to reopen the
RFS debate,194 but even if the legislature embraces revision, political
auguring suggests a complete reworking of the RINs compliance
system is unlikely.
Thus, legislative repeal, though clearly a potential remedy for
impacted parties under the RFS, is both highly improbable and
extremely susceptible to shifts in the political climate. Considering the
likelihood of political tumult in the next few years—not to mention
the need for sustained legislative effort to affect such a large redirect
in energy policy—congressional revision of the RFS is simply
unworkable. Furthermore, the Trump Administration’s recent EPA
directives concerning RIN market transparency195 suggest that, despite
considerable pressure from the oil industry,196 any change will come
not from Congress but from the Executive Branch.
2.

The death of independent refining as a legitimate business model
On the other extreme lies a simple solution for independent refiners
struggling under the financial weight of the RFS compliance regime:
abandon the business altogether. Theoretically speaking, it may be that
the regulatory hurdles embodied in the RFS reflect legislative intent to
dissuade oil producers from maintaining outdated business models.
Indeed, among the supporters of the RFS, this argument remains
popular.197 Such an argument, which in many ways contemplates a
“natural death” for the independent refining industry, would also seem
justified by data showing slumping gasoline consumption in the United
ethanol plants in the U.S. has doubled and the average price of corn has nearly
doubled since 2005).
194. See Miranda Green, Trump Signals Support for Changing Summer Ethanol Policy,
THE HILL (Apr. 12, 2018, 2:45 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energyenvironment/382891-trump-signals-support-for-changing-policy-on-summer-ethanoluse (detailing congressional discussions with the President to come to an agreement
for changing the current ethanol policy).
195. See supra note 112 (summarizing the Trump Administration’s proposed
modifications to the RIN market).
196. See supra note 187.
197. See RENEWABLE FUELS ASS’N, BIG OIL’S SELF-INFLICTED BLEND WALL AND ITS
IMPACT ON RIN PRICING
1–2
(2015),
http://www.ethanolrfa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/RIN-Prices-Blend-Wall_July-update.pdf (arguing that RIN
price volatility and stiflingly high RFS compliance costs are fictions fabricated by the
oil industry to excuse the industry’s refusal to embrace the production of “higher-level
ethanol blends”).

698

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:667

States.198 Projections for a continued decline in gasoline demand,199
coupled with a growing shift in the makeup of the transportation sector200
and expectations for a steady increase in energy efficient vehicles,201 could
suggest that the demise of independent refining is inevitable.
It is not unprecedented for Congress to enact regulations that catalyze
the demise of an industry or subindustry, either directly or indirectly.202
However, whether the independent refining business model faces
extinction is irrelevant considering how long it would take for the oil
industry to embrace and carry out such a shift in the organizational
paradigm. Moreover, simply concluding that independent refiners—
and perhaps the petroleum fuel industry altogether—will inevitably
become obsolete would be to ignore the very real socioeconomic
impacts of such an extinction. For example, when Philadelphia Energy
Solutions filed for bankruptcy in January 2018, debt-restructuring
signaled that the approximately one-thousand jobs created by the
refiner were in jeopardy.203 As political response to the decline of the
coal industry attests204 that while creating winners and losers in the
198. See Renewable Fuel Standard Facts, supra note 185 (showing the slight decrease in
motor gasoline consumption over time).
199. See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2018: WITH
PROJECTIONS TO 2050 4, 108 (2018), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/
AEO2018.pdf [hereinafter ENERGY OUTLOOK 2018] (predicting a sharp drop in
commercial use of motor gasoline between 2018 and 2022 and general downtrend in
consumption from 2022 to 2050).
200. See Giovanni Bruno, Uber and Lyft Have Run Over the Car Industry, THE STREET
(Sept. 2, 2017, 11:03 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/14290318/1/how-uberand-lyft-are-rapidly-changing-the-transportation-industry
(discussing
growing
concerns in the automotive industry that the rise of rideshare businesses may reduce
demand for consumer automobiles).
201. See ENERGY OUTLOOK 2018, supra note 199, at 112–16 (charting expectations
for increased energy efficiency for all vehicles through 2025).
202. See, e.g., Justin Worland, Coal’s Last Kick: As Clean Energy Rises, West Virginia
Looks past Trump’s Embrace of Coal to What Comes Next, TIME, http://time.com/coalslast-kick (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (attributing the coal industry’s decline in energy
market share to its “environmental problem” and the rise of renewable power sources
like wind and solar).
203. See Miranda Green, Largest East Coast Oil Refiner Owner Files for Bankruptcy:
Report, THE HILL (Jan. 22, 2018, 4:56 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energyenvironment/370170-largest-east-coast-oil-refinery-owner-files-for-bankruptcy-report
(detailing an internal memo from Philadelphia Energy Solution stating the
bankruptcy would not immediately affect its employees).
204. See Eric Lipton & Barry Meier, Under Trump, Coal Mining Gets New Life on U.S.
Lands, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/06/us/
politics/under-trump-coal-mining-gets-new-life-on-us-lands.html
(discussing
the
Trump Administration’s supportive responses to coal industry groups, which one coal
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name of progress may be palatable, simply abandoning an industry
entirely is an altogether different proposition.
Overall, while allowing the RFS to accelerate what may be the
inevitable demise of independent oil refining would erase the need for
regulatory reform, it is, quite literally, no solution at all.
3.

Challenging EPA rulemaking
Because the Clean Air Act and the EISA deputize the EPA for the
enforcement of the RFS, the option exists to challenge EPA
rulemaking as arbitrary and capricious.205 After all, the regulations
providing compliance protocols for obligated parties derive mostly
from EPA rulemaking.
This solution is best illustrated in the model proposed by
commentators Bob Neufeld and Rebecca Lynne Fey,206 in which
independent refiners challenge the EPA’s definition of “obligated
parties” as an unreasonable interpretation of the authority conferred
by the EISA.207 Neufeld and Fey reason that because the EISA explicitly
directs the EPA to enact a program that “ensure[s] that transportation
fuel . . . contains at least the applicable volume of renewable fuel,”208
the EPA’s creation of a regulatory program that rewards voluntary
blenders that blend below targets209 is inherently unreasonable.
While inarguably sound, challenging the RINs scheme by attacking the
EPA’s final rules exposes the argument to the legal quagmires of the
Administrative Procedure Act210 and Chevron deference.211 However
persuasive, any rule-based challenge to the RINs program is comparatively
ineffective, as it is well-settled that agency rules are insulated by an
mining company described as “meant to correct wrongs of the past”); see also Katie
Fehrenbacher, This is How Political the Decline of Coal Has Become, FORTUNE (Oct. 5,
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/ 05/don-blankenship-political-prisoner (noting
then-candidate Donald Trump’s campaign promises to bring back coal jobs).
205. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (permitting a reviewing court to set aside an
agency action if “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law”).
206. See Neufeld & Fey, supra note 91, at 298 (illustrating a hypothetical RFS challenge
focused on disputing the validity of the EPA’s interpretation of its statutory mandate).
207. See id. at 299.
208. See id. at 300 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(iii)).
209. Because voluntary blenders have no RVOs, their RINs increase in value when
obligated parties are unable to meet their compliance requirements and the demand for
separated RINs increases. See id. at 298. Accordingly, the EPA’s RIN program creates a
“perverse incentive” for voluntary blenders to resist renewable volume targets. See id.
210. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59.
211. See supra notes 179–183 and accompanying text.
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“exceedingly deferential”212 standard of review. Furthermore, while
challenges to tangentially similar EPA interpretations of the EISA in
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA213 and Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA214 may have succeeded,215 they are easily distinguishable.
First, American Petroleum concerned the EPA’s methodology for
calculating volume targets for cellulosic biofuel,216 an extremely small
piece of the regulatory scheme. Whereas cellulosic biofuel volumes
made up just 1.2 percent of the total renewable fuel target in 2017,217
challenging the reasonableness of the EPA’s definition of “obligated
party” involves the entire regulatory framework.218 Second, Utility Air
involved an EPA decision that had nationwide ramifications; the
agency’s interpretation effectively rendered every source of particle
emissions, mobile or stationary, subject to EPA permitting
requirements.219 The EPA’s imposition of its RINs scheme, by
comparison, is industry-specific and not controlling over the
nationwide economy;220 a factor the Supreme Court found highly
persuasive in Utility Air.221 Thus, while the RINs scheme may indeed
involve an agency rule involving “vast ‘economic and political

212. Defs. of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 733 F.3d 1106, 1115 (11th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 541 (11th Cir. 1996)) (referring
specifically to the deference used when an agency action is challenged as arbitrary and
capricious).
213. 706 F.3d 474 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
214. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
215. See, e.g., id. at 2444 (ruling that the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act’s
greenhouse gas permitting thresholds was unreasonable because it impermissibly
expanded the EPA’s regulatory authority without express congressional approval); Am.
Petroleum, 706 F.3d at 476 (holding unreasonable the EPA’s methodology for setting
annual cellulosic biofuel volume targets).
216. See Am. Petroleum, 706 F.3d at 475–76.
217. See Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2017, and the Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for
2018, EPA: RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD PROGRAM, https://www.epa.gov/renewablefuel-standard-program/final-renewable-fuel-standards-2017-and-biomass-based-dieselvolume (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (showing that the EPA in 2017 required total
blending of just 311 million gallons of cellulosic biofuel as part of a total annual
renewable volume target of 25.871 billion gallons).
218. Am. Petroleum, 706 F.3d at 480 (emphasizing the permissive pursuit of a
regulatory objective).
219. See Util. Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2436 (noting that the EPA itself recognized that the
application of the proposed threshold would “have a profound effect on virtually every
sector of the economy and touch every household in the land”).
220. Id.
221. See id. at 2444 (acknowledging that the EPA rulemaking under review involved
“an agency laying claim to extravagant statutory power over the national economy”).
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significance,’”222 the scope of the regime falls short of the “extravagant
statutory power”223 at issue in Utility Air.
Straying into the jurisprudential thicket inherent in an arbitraryand-capricious-based agency decision challenge represents a lesseffective means of contesting the legality of the EPA’s RINs program.
C. A Novel Approach: Applying Chief Justice Roberts’s
Commerce Clause Holding from Sebelius
While previous solutions have proposed various administrative
challenges to the RFS and its RINs scheme, no theory has called into
question the constitutionality of the scheme. To do so, a challenger
must first tie the RINs scheme to the enabling statutes of the RFS to
avoid a likely unwinnable skirmish with Chevron.224 This requires
demonstrating that Congress, not the EPA, forces independent
refiners to participate in a secondary compliance market.
1.

A threshold matter: the RINs scheme is a work of Congress, not the EPA
First, Congress expressly contemplated a credit-based compliance
system in the Clean Air Act, making RINs a statutory creation, not the
product of agency rulemaking. Consider that the original RFS
established by the Clean Air Act references a “credit program”225 as the
mechanism for demonstrating compliance with the renewable fuel
volume requirements.226 Illustrative here is Congress’s use of the word
“shall”227 in the language of the statute, demonstrating that RINs have
their origins not in agency rulemaking, but in legislative action.
Similarly, the Clean Air Act also explicitly authorizes the transfer of
compliance credits, making clear that Congress, not the EPA, created
the secondary market for RINs. Here, the statutory language is
unambiguous—the generation and transfer of RINs exists “for the

222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Philadelphia Energy Solutions’s bankruptcy and its alleged origins in the RFS
compliance regime provides a useful assemblage of circumstances that might produce
an eligible plaintiff, but this Comment does not analyze the important constitutional
issue of standing. While Philadelphia Energy Solutions likely has standing to challenge
the RFS on constitutional grounds, the various arguments for and against a federal
court’s acknowledgement of standing in this matter is beyond the scope of this Comment.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(5) (2012).
226. See id. §§ 7545(o)(2), (5) (connecting the credit program to compliance with
the renewable fuel volume obligation at the core of the RFS).
227. Id. § 7545(o)(5)(A).
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purpose of complying with [renewable fuel obligations].”228 Thus,
although EPA regulations provide added specificity as to the
characteristics and fungibility of RINs,229 they owe their existence not
to the EPA, but to a federal statute.
Additionally, this understanding of the legal authority for RINs is
consistent with the EPA’s own understanding of the RFS mandate. In
2015, Janet McCabe, the Acting Assistant Administrator of the Office
of Air and Radiation of the EPA, acknowledged that RINs owe their
existence not to agency rulemaking, but to the will of Congress.230 In
a hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and
Federal Management, McCabe explicitly referenced RINs as a
congressional invention,231 referring to the compliance credit regime
as a system that “Congress set up.”232
Accepting that RINs originate in federal law, the authority on which
Congress based the RFS is of vital importance. Obviously, if Congress
did not invoke its Commerce Clause power in enacting the RFS, the
regime itself is not exposed to a challenge on those grounds.
Helpfully, Congress included in its empowerment of the EPA an
explicit reference to enabling authority, notably introducing the RFS
with the following:
The Administrator may by regulation designate any fuel or fuel
additive . . . and, after such date or dates as may be prescribed by
him, no manufacturer or processor of any such fuel or additive may
sell, offer for sale, or introduce into commerce such fuel or additive unless
the Administrator has registered such fuel or additive . . . .233

Thus, while one Congress’s other enumerated powers might insulate
the statute from constitutional challenge, its express invocation of the
Commerce Clause places the RFS within the bounds of Commerce
Clause authority. Accordingly, if Chief Justice Roberts’s holding in
Sebelius indeed reflects binding precedent, Congress’s compulsion that
oil refiners participate in a secondary market for RINs places the RFS

228. Id. § 7545(o)(5)(B).
229. See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 80.1400–80.1474 (2017) (outlining the EPA’s
rulemaking enforcing the RFS and detailing the creation and permissible uses of RINs).
230. See Re-Examining EPA’s Management of the Renewable Fuel Standard Program:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management of the S. Comm.
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 71 (2015) (statement of
Janet McCabe, Acting Assistant Administrator, Office of Air and Radiation, EPA).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(a) (emphasis added).
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within the scope of what Sebelius suggests is an impermissible use of the
Commerce Clause power.
Chief Justice Roberts’s Commerce Clause holding in Sebelius is binding precedent
While some legal scholars, and even some district and circuit courts,
argue otherwise, the most logical and jurisprudentially meaningful
interpretation of the Sebelius decision is that Chief Justice Roberts’s
Commerce Clause holding reflects binding precedent. Arguments to
the contrary generally note that none of the dissenters in Sebelius
joined any portion of the Chief Justice’s opinion, nor did they agree to
the judgment of the Court overall.234 The opposing view thus
concludes that the Chief Justice’s opinion was merely a concurrence,
robbing the portion of the opinion concerning the ban on compelled
market participation of any precedential value.235
Opposing arguments ignore that the Sebelius dissenters agreed that
the individual mandate could be upheld under Congress’s power to
tax and spend, which is vital to interpreting which pieces of the Chief
Justice’s opinion command the support of the majority of the Court.
Importantly, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion expressly rejected any
contention that the Court could reach the question of whether the
mandate could be upheld under the taxing and spending power without
first “deciding the Commerce Clause” question.236 Here, the structure
of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, and the dissent’s acknowledgement
of its logical progression, makes clear that a majority of the Court
affirmed the Chief Justice’s Commerce Clause holding.
In terms of structure, Chief Justice Roberts’s Sebelius opinion addresses
each potential justification for the ACA in turn, exhausting each proposed
extension of congressional power before proceeding to the next. To this
end, the Chief Justice does not address whether the individual mandate
of the ACA may be upheld as an extension of Congress’s taxing and
2.

234. See United States v. Spann, No. 3:12-CR-126-L, 2012 WL 4341799, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 24, 2012) (arguing that while the “joint dissent” of Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito also stated that the Commerce Clause did not justify the individual
mandate, they did not join any portion of the Chief Justice’s opinion, which contained
the reasoning against market compulsion), aff’d, 562 F. App’x 237 (5th Cir. 2014).
235. See United States v. Moore, No. CR-12-6023-RMP, 2012 WL 3780343, at *3 (E.D.
Wash. Aug. 31, 2012) (applying the narrowest-ground doctrine to conclude that the
“conglomeration” of the four dissenting justices with the “concurring opinion” of
Chief Justice John Roberts does not reflect binding precedent).
236. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574–75 (2012) (Roberts,
C.J.) (refusing to address whether the individual mandate might survive under a
“saving construction” as a tax without first addressing the Commerce Clause issue).
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spending power without first concluding, without equivocation, that “the
Commerce Clause does not support the individual mandate.”237 This is
key for the dissenters—comprised of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito—who structured their reasoning in the same fashion,
proceeding to alternative justifications for the individual mandate only
after grappling with the Commerce Clause issue.238 Logically, this
parallelism invites the interpretation that the dissenters, like the Chief
Justice, only reach the issue of whether the individual mandate is a valid
extension of Congress’s taxing and spending power by first recognizing
that the Commerce Clause does not apply.
Of course, it is not by argument structure alone that suggests the
dissenters joined Chief Justice Roberts’s Commerce Clause
conclusions. To the contrary, the dissenters state that Congress’s
attempt to regulate inactivity is precisely why the individual mandate
extends beyond the scope of Commerce Clause authority. Consider
first that in addressing Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, which accepted the
individual mandate as within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority,
the dissenters explicitly state that a failure to purchase health
insurance is not an activity that Congress may regulate because it, by
nature, does not represent activity at all.239 In so reacting to Justice
Ginsburg’s challenges, the dissenters thus lend precedential weight to
Chief Justice Roberts’s Commerce Clause holding, as the opinions
marshal the same logic in reaching their legal conclusions.
Furthermore, in grappling with the limits of the Commerce Clause
power, the dissenters take steps to distinguish both Wickard v. Filburn240 and
Perez v. United States241 by drawing limits to the Commerce Clause power that
mirrors the reasoning of Chief Justice Roberts.242 Acknowledging that
Wickard and Perez represent “the most expansive assertion of the commerce
power in our history,”243 the dissenters nevertheless clarify that both cases
involved some affirmative activity, not inactivity. To the dissenters’
argument, whereas Wickard involved the decision to grow wheat for
personal use244 and Perez concerned local practices of dishonest money

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 561.
Id. at 562–63.
See id. at 660 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
402 U.S. 146 (1971).
See id. at 158; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 657–58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113.
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lending,245 each circumstance involved commercial action. By contrast,
had Congress attempted to regulate by compelling the defendants in
Wickard and Perez to grow wheat and make loans, respectively, such an action
would mark an impermissible extension of federal power.246 Thus, the
dissenters concluded, compelling individuals to engage in a commercial
action—purchasing healthcare—was beyond the scope of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power.247
Accordingly, in explicitly mirroring the Chief Justice’s Commerce
Clause reasoning248 and then proceeding to analyze whether the
individual mandate might be justified as a tax,249 the four dissenters
rendered the Chief Justice’s Commerce Clause discussion binding
precedent by a five-to-four majority.250 Furthermore, the dissenters own
words make clear their views on whether the Commerce Clause may be so
construed when they stated that Congress may not justify the regulation of
commercial action under the mere guise of “compelling its existence.”251
Moreover, while controversy persists and the Supreme Court has yet
to clarify what portions of its Sebelius decision hold precedential weight,
the dominant interpretation in lower federal courts and among legal
scholars is clearly that the Chief Justice’s opinion is part of the Court’s
holding.252 Thus, even in the absence of jurisprudential clarity, or even
245. Perez, 402 U.S. at 147.
246. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 657 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the idea that
federal power includes the right to compel affirmative commercial activity).
247. Id. at 657–58.
248. Compare id. at 553 (Roberts, C.J.) (“The farmer in Wickard was at least actively
engaged in the production of wheat . . . . The Government’s theory here would
effectively override that limitation, by establishing that individuals may be regulated
under the Commerce Clause whenever enough of them are not doing something the
Government would have them do.”), with id. at 657 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]o say
that the failure to grow wheat . . . affects commerce, so that growing . . . can be
federally compelled, is to extend federal power to virtually everything.”).
249. See id. at 661 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing that “Congress has attempted to
regulate beyond the scope of its Commerce Clause authority,” before proceeding to a
Taxing Power analysis).
250. Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan argued that the individual mandate
was within Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 589 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
251. Id. at 649 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252. Many circuits seem to clearly interpret Chief Justice Roberts’s discussion on
the limitations of the Commerce Clause power as binding. See, e.g., United States v.
McLean, 702 F. App’x 81, 87–88 (3rd Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court held that the
Affordable Care Act’s requirement that individuals purchase health insurance or
suffer a penalty was not a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce power.”); United
States v. Robbins, 729 F.3d 131, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2013) (assuming for the purposes of
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consistent treatment amongst circuits, the application of the Chief
Justice’s opinion in cases throughout the lower federal courts strongly
suggests that the Commerce Clause reasoning is already accepted.
Many legal commentators draw similar conclusions, finding that the
Roberts’s holding likely functions as a “holding in practice,”253 if not
one explicitly recognized.254
3.

The RFS is uniquely exposed to a post-Sebelius Commerce Clause challenge
As discussed above,255 many litigants have attempted to use Sebelius
to challenge other forms of legislation as an impermissible extension
of Congress’s Commerce Clause power. Although each has failed, they

analysis that the Commerce Clause commentary was controlling); United States v.
Rose, 714 F.3d 362, 371 (6th Cir. 2013) (interpreting Chief Justice Robert’s opinion as
a holding); United States v. Henry, 688 F.3d 637, 641 n.5 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to
address the issue of holding versus dicta but distinguishing the case at hand using
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion). Many district courts seem similarly inclined. See, e.g.,
United States v. Stacey, No. 2:12-15, 2013 WL 1891342, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2013)
(applying Chief Justice Robert’s Commerce Clause discussion as binding precedent
and acknowledging that other district courts have done the same when addressing the
exact argument at issue), aff’d, 570 F. App’x 213 (3d Cir. 2014); McElveen v. Mike
Reichenbach Ford Lincoln, Inc., No. 4:12-874-RBH-KDW, 2012 WL 3964973, at *3
(D.S.C. Aug. 22, 2012) (accepting that “because the Commerce Clause permits power
over ‘activity,’ it does not support the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act
because it would permit Congress to regulate inactivity rather than existing
commercial activity” (citing Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 551 (C.J., Roberts)); United States v.
Williams, No. 12-60116-CR-RNS, 2012 WL 3242043, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2012)
(stating that “the Court [in Sebelius] found Congress’s attempt to require everyone buy
health insurance exceeded its power under the commerce clause”).
253. See Bradley W. Joondeph, The Affordable Care Act and the Commerce Power: Much
Ado About (Nearly) Nothing, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 23 (Feb. 2013).
254. See, e.g., Joseph Fiskin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175, 186
n.54 (referring to Chief Justice Roberts’s Commerce Clause opinion as a holding in
Sebelius); Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court 2011 Term–Foreword: Democracy and
Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2012); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, et al., Employers
United: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Political Speech in the Wake of the Affordable Care
Act, 38 J. CORP. L. 217, 253 (2013) (noting as a “holding” in Sebelius “that the ACA’s
minimum essential coverage requirement is unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause”); David L. Sloss, Kiobel and Extraterritoriality: A Rule Without a Rationale, 28 MD.
J. INTL’L L. 241, 253 n.75 (2013) (“In Sebelius, the Court created a new, unprecedented
constitutional limitation on Congress’ Commerce Power.”); Solum, supra note 24, at 2
(“The strongest argument for a Commerce Clause holding postulates that NFIB has
stare decisis effects in cases in which another individual mandate (relatively similar to
the mandate in the ACA) is enforced by a criminal penalty—or other penalty that
could not be fairly characterized as a tax via a saving construction.”).
255. See supra Section I.C.2 (describing notable post-Sebelius Commerce Clause
challenges to other federal statutes).
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do not stand for the proposition that Chief Justice Roberts’s
Commerce Clause holding has been isolated to the facts of Sebelius
alone. To the contrary, while previous cases invoking Sebelius involve
challenges based on similar logic, they do not represent the unique
circumstances at hand with the RFS and RINs.
First, although Lott and its sibling cases seem to justify compelled
market participation by claiming that Sebelius can be read
harmoniously with Congress’s need to regulate interstate activity, the
activity at issue in Lott was notably noneconomic.256 Furthermore, the
court in Lott was concerned primarily with a challenge to uniquely
intrastate activity and thus availed itself of precedent from Gonzales v.
Raich,257 which Chief Justice Roberts’s holding in Sebelius notably left
intact.258 Conversely, the activity at hand in the RFS challenge—the
purchase of RINs—is both inherently economic and interstate in nature,
clearly distinguishing the challenge from that in Lott and its brethren.
Similarly, unlike the challenges at issue in McLean and Spann,259 the
RFS does not seek to enforce criminal sanctions; a matter that was
dispositive on the Commerce Clause challenge in both cases.260
Instead, Congress in the RFS legislated that compliance violations

256. United States v. Lott, 912 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D. Vt. 2012), aff’d, 750 F.3d 214
(2d Cir. 2014); see also supra Sections I.C.2.a and I.C.2.b (examining Lott and its
companion cases).
257. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). In Gonzales, the Supreme Court upheld provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act that criminalized the manufacture, distribution, and
possession of marijuana as a permissible extension of Congress’s Commerce Clause
power despite the inherently intrastate nature of the underlying conduct. Id. at 17.
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, acknowledged that the defendants’ use of
marijuana within California was unquestionably intrastate in nature, but nonetheless
recognized that the prohibition of a “quintessentially economic” activity like intrastate
drug use was within Congress’s Commerce Clause power. Id. at 25–26.
258. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 561 (2012) (Roberts,
C.J.) (“Congress’s attempt to regulate the interstate market for marijuana would
therefore have been substantially undercut if it could not also regulate intrastate
possession and consumption.” (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 19)).
259. See supra notes 161–166 and accompanying text (summarizing the facts at issue
in McLean and Spann).
260. See United States v. McLean, 702 F. App’x 81, 88 (3rd Cir. 2017) (clarifying
that Sebelius did not concern Congress’s ability to proscribe criminal acts); United
States v. Spann, No. 3:12-CR-126-L, 2012 WL 4341799, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2012)
(distinguishing compelled action from the prohibition of criminal activity), aff’d, 562
F. App’x 237 (5th Cir. 2014).
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carry civil penalties.261 Cases like McLean and Spann are thus
distinguishable because, unlike the RFS, they seek to prohibit criminal
action. By comparison, what the RFS seeks to do is achieve policy goals
by compelling participation in statutorily created secondary market.262
Finally, although Goethel is perhaps the clearest factual parallel to a
challenge to the RINs scheme,263 it too is distinguishable. Unlike the
commercial fishermen in Goethel, independent refiners are not faced
with avoidable regulation. Whereas the commercial fishermen had the
option of simply changing the areas in which they fished,264
independent refiners have no such option. Their choice, if one exists
at all, is illusory: they either comply by entering a market they
otherwise would not, or they face penalties from the EPA. Key to the
District of New Hampshire’s justification in Goethel was that nothing
Congress required “taxe[d], assesse[d] fees, or otherwise penalize[d]
[fishermen] for choosing a course of action . . . that did not require atsea monitoring.”265 Independent refiners, by comparison, are subject
to penalty unless they participate in the market for RINs.266 Instead,
they are plainly “compelled” within the definition contemplated by
Chief Justice Roberts in Sebelius.
4. The RFS forces independent refiners to participate in specified commercial
action, exposing it to a Sebelius challenge
Independent refiners are in a unique position to challenge the RINs
scheme because they do not blend fuel and thus do not actively engage
in the RINs market. Here, the circumstances cited by Philadelphia
Energy Solutions in its bankruptcy filing are illustrative.267
Because Philadelphia Energy Solutions does not have the
infrastructure necessary to blend fuel itself, it cannot generate RINs on
its own.268 Instead, the refiner must purchase separated RINs from

261. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(d)(1) (2012) (establishing that any party found in violation
of the RFS “shall be liable to the United States for a civil penalty of not more than the
sum of $25,000” for each day not in conformance with the compliance regime).
262. See supra Section I.B.1.
263. See generally supra notes 167–175 and accompanying text.
264. Goethel v. Prtizker, No. 15-cv-497-JL, 2016 WL 4076831, at *2–5 (D.N.H. July
29, 2016), aff’d, 854 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 2017).
265. Id. at *7 (fourth alteration in original).
266. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 80.1358–80.1361 (2017) (describing the penalties for violating
the RIN program).
267. See Egan, supra note 26.
268. Id.
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those parties who blend more than their volume obligation.269 Key
here is Chief Justice Roberts’s classification of “active” and “inactive”
parties in commerce, which lends itself quite clearly to vertically
integrated and independent refiners. Vertically integrated refiners,
who blend fuel as a part of their business model, are voluntary
participants in fuel blending and thus qualify as “active” parties in
commerce. Following Chief Justice Roberts’s Sebelius logic, requiring
vertically integrated refiners to participate in a compliance scheme
grounded in an extension of their business is clearly within Congress’s
Commerce Clause power. Conversely, independent refiners like
Philadelphia Energy Solutions would never participate in the market
for RINs were it not for Congress’s RFS mandate.
Additionally, recall that, like the penalty facing individuals who did
not secure insurance coverage in Sebelius, obligated parties who do not
secure sufficient RINs to meet their RVO are subject to civil penalties
under the RFS. Refiners like Philadelphia Energy Solutions really have
no choice at all; instead, they are compelled “to become active in
commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that their failure
to do so affects interstate commerce.”270
Admittedly, one distinction between the ACA and the RFS is that the
individual mandate found unconstitutional in the former applied to
all citizens of the United States, whereas the RINs scheme in the RFS
concerns only “obligated parties” as defined by the statute. However,
Chief Justice Roberts did not limit his restriction on the Commerce
Clause to only those statutes compelling all citizens to engage in
commercial activity. Rather, the Chief Justice connected his reasoning
to the Supreme Court’s earlier holdings in Raich and Perez by drawing
a distinction between permissible congressional regulation of
“class[es] of activities”271 and of impermissible compulsion of “classes of
individuals.”272 The fatal flaw of the individual mandate, according to
the Chief Justice, was that Congress attempted to regulate uninsured
individuals on the basis that their decision not to engage in the
healthcare market constituted a legitimate basis for classification based
on activity.273 Instead, Chief Justice Roberts held impermissible simply

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id.; see also Maykuth, supra note 126.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 552 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.).
Id. at 556 (alteration in original) (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005)).
Id. (citing United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 153 (1971)).
Id.
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classifying a group for regulation solely because its members “elected
to refrain from commercial activity.”274
This line of reasoning is relevant for two reasons. First, it suggests that
Sebelius is not limited to situations involving attempts to regulate all
citizens; it instead establishes that the Commerce Clause does not
authorize the regulation of individuals based on identifying
characteristics separate from “any activity in which they are engaged.”275
Second, and perhaps most importantly, Chief Justice Roberts’s reasoning
makes clear that permissible regulation strays into unjustifiable
compulsion when the qualifying criterion for compulsory participation in
a federal scheme is commercial inactivity rather than activity.276
The RFS’s treatment of independent refiners runs afoul of these
principles. Unlike the classification in Perez, which concerned an
affirmative commercial action, the RFS’s compulsory RINs scheme,
like the ACA’s individual mandate, compels market participation
based solely on a decision not to engage in certain commercial
behavior. As Philadelphia Energy Solutions made clear, independent
oil refiners make a choice not to participate in fuel blending, reflecting
a decision to avoid a specific commercial action. In forcing
Philadelphia Energy Solutions and other independent refiners to
participate in a secondary market for compliance credits generated
only through fuel blending, Congress has effectively “force[d]
individuals into commerce precisely because they elected to refrain
from commercial activity.”277 Any law so operating, per Sebelius, cannot
be justified under the Commerce Clause.278
CONCLUSION
The effects of the RFS are far-reaching, impacting everything from
the cost of public transit to employment statistics to the price of
groceries. However, the recent bankruptcy of Philadelphia Energy
Solutions signals that, despite the EPA’s best efforts, the shortcomings
of the RFS that felled the likes of Jeff Gunselman and OceanConnect
six years ago are not curable through patchwork means or stop-gap
measures. For at the heart of the program lies a fatal flaw: a credit-
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276. See id. at 557 (declining to recognize the uninsured as a class defined by any
activity because their identifying feature was uniquely uneconomic).
277. Id. at 558.
278. Id. at 556.

2018] CHALLENGING THE BROKEN RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD

711

based compliance scheme that unfairly burdens some oil producers
simply because they do not engage in fuel-blending.
Nevertheless, in this flaw lies a rare opportunity for a prospective
challenger like Philadelphia Energy Solutions to circumvent the
political and procedurals thickets of legislative revision and
administrative law by pursuing RFS revision or repeal through
constitutional means. Namely, by utilizing Chief Justice Roberts’s
Commerce Clause holding in Sebelius, an RFS challenger may invoke
the core constitutional principle embraced in that case by a majority
of Supreme Court Justices: Congress may regulate commercial activity
but may not compel it.
This principle has already clearly taken root in lower federal courts,
even without definitive clarification on the state of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence from the Supreme Court itself. In mounting a Sebeliusbased challenge to the RFS as an unconstitutional extension of
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, a plaintiff like Philadelphia
Energy Solutions not only strikes at the real failing of the program
overall, but also provides the Supreme Court with the opportunity to
more firmly delineate the bounds of an integral congressional power.
Such a challenge presents the rare opportunity for a challenger to
expedite a needed shift in truly impactful legislation as well as push the
judiciary to harmonize its constitutional jurisprudence.
The RFS is indeed broken, despite its lofty aspirations and
undeniably good intentions. Although the system may have indeed
proven to be a train wreck, the clearest legal avenue for cleanup could
bring clarity to an unsettled question on the constitutional limits of
congressional power.

